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BOOK REVIEWS

NOT THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ
Smith, General Sir Rupert. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. London: Penguin,
2005. 428pp. £25

Military theorists around the globe have
noted changes in the landscape of warfare—nonstate actors, asymmetric
threats, technology proliferation,
etc.—and suggested that the military
forces currently fielded by Western nations are not equipped to respond to
them. The latest product of this analysis
is The Utility of Force: The Art of War in
the Modern World, by General Sir
Rupert Smith.
Smith certainly has the appropriate credentials to write about the topic. He
commanded the British 1st Armoured
Division in the first Gulf war and was
commander of UN forces in Bosnia at
the time of the Dayton Peace Accords
in 1995. After three years as General
Officer Commanding Northern Ireland,
he became Deputy Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (DSACEUR), serving as second in command to a U.S.
general, Wesley Clark, during the
NATO air campaign in Kosovo.
The variety of the author’s experiences
throughout his distinguished career is
critical, because these experiences constitute the framework for his thinking
about war. First, he emphasizes the
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importance of separately considering
the effects of force at the three levels of
war: tactical, operational (or theater, as
Smith prefers), and strategic. Having
held commands at each level, he has
gained his appreciation of this firsthand. Second, much of Smith’s command experience has been as part of
coalitions, which he recognizes will
continue to play a significant role in future warfare. Finally, he taxonomizes
modern warfare—which he dates from
the wars of Napoleon—into three distinct forms of war, corresponding
roughly to three historical periods: interstate industrial war, the Cold War
(which he regards as primarily an
anomaly of the era of mutually assured
destruction), and “war amongst the
people.” Just as Smith has commanded
troops at each of the levels of war, he
has served in some capacity in all three
forms of war.
The most novel contribution Smith
makes is his discussion of the implications of “war amongst the people.” This
is grounded in the idea that troops today are committed for much different
reasons than in the days of Clausewitz,
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and against much different enemies—
enemies who do not wear a uniform
but move freely “amongst the people.”
Smith uses this idea to examine past
conflicts, touching on the guerrilla
fighters operating on the Iberian Peninsula in the Napoleonic wars before
moving on to analyze the British successes in Malaya, the French and American failures in Vietnam, and the two
Gulf wars. Thereafter, he develops a series of questions for commanders to ask
prior to the employment of force and
devotes the penultimate chapter to applying these questions, albeit post hoc,
to his experience in Bosnia.
The Utility of Force is not a scholarly
work, nor does it claim to be; it has few
footnotes and no bibliography, but neither does it need them. The book is not
military history but rather a skillfully
presented interpretation of certain
trends in the history of warfare. Meanwhile, it raises a number of important
questions that all future strategic leaders should be considering.
ROBERT BOLIA

Air Force Research Laboratory
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base

Fontenot, Gregory, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn.
On Point: The United States Army in Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2005. 539pp. $34.95

On Point, as stated in its opening pages,
is clearly intended for a professional
military audience. General Eric K.
Shinseki, former chief of staff of the
Army, commissioned this work in 2003
as an after-action review. The overarching purposes were to educate soldiers
and defense professionals with respect
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to the conduct of combat in Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and to suggest
implications for continued U.S. Army
transformation.
In telling the story of the Army in OIF,
the authors appeal not only to the target
audience but to the general public at
large through objective and informative
analysis. On Point provides a clear appreciation for the complexities involved
in planning, preparation, and execution
of military operations across the range of
military operations. Further, On Point
provides the lay reader insight into the
after-action-review process, which remains critical to advancing institutional
learning and improving the future application of the armed forces as an instrument of national power.
On Point tells the story from a decidedly Army perspective. The discussion
encompasses topics essentially in three
parts, from the strategic-operational
level down to the tactical level of war.
The first discusses the Army preparation for OIF. The second focuses on the
ground war through the conclusion of
major offensive combat operations. It is
discussed in four phases: Phase I—
preparation, Phase II—shaping the
battlespace, Phase III—decisive offensive operations, and Phase IV—posthostilities. Finally there is an analysis of
the campaign’s implications regarding
future conflict, Army organization, and
transformation to a future force. Army
successes and failures are clearly delineated, along with the authors’ recommendations for the future.
Like many military books written by
military officers and professionals, On
Point often suffers from an overemphasis on acronyms and abbreviations,
making the writing sometimes dry and
overly detailed. Nonetheless, the
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